{"id":20,"date":"2013-08-27T22:45:35","date_gmt":"2013-08-27T22:45:35","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/opentextbc.ca\/modernphilosophy\/?post_type=chapter&p=20"},"modified":"2014-02-18T06:47:18","modified_gmt":"2014-02-18T06:47:18","slug":"minilogic-and-glossary","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/opentextbc.ca\/modernphilosophy\/chapter\/minilogic-and-glossary\/","title":{"raw":"Minilogic and Glossary","rendered":"Minilogic and Glossary"},"content":{"raw":"Like any discipline, philosophy has its own vocabulary. Here are some of the most basic terms and the connections among them:\r\n\r\n
Position<\/strong><\/dt>
A position (or a thesis) is a claim or set of claims; for example, that the mind is identical to the brain, or that people act always from self-interest.<\/dd>
Argument<\/strong><\/dt>
An argument is a set of claims (called \u2018premises\u2019) designed to show another claim (a conclusion) to be true. (This is a special use of the word: usually people use \u2018argument\u2019 to mean a verbal altercation). For example:Premise 1:<\/em> If it\u2019s raining outside, the lawnmower will get wet.<\/dd>
<\/dd>
Premise 2:<\/em> It\u2019s raining outside.Conclusion<\/em>: The lawnmower will get wet.\r\n\r\n<\/dd><\/dl>As you can see, arguments aren\u2019t peculiar to philosophy: we use them all the time to get around the world, although we almost never bother to make them explicit. Even in this class, we won\u2019t always go to the trouble of putting arguments in this explicit form. But it can often be helpful to do so, and it\u2019s important that arguments can<\/em> be make explicit. To see why, consider an argument put forth by the British Medical Association:\r\n
Premise 1:<\/em> Boxing is a dangerous activity.\r\n\r\nConclusion:<\/em> Boxing should be banned.<\/blockquote>\r\nDoes the premise entail the conclusion? That is, does the premise show the conclusion to be true? In other words, is this a valid argument<\/strong>\u2014one whose premises entail the conclusion? (Another way to put it: a valid argument is such that it\u2019s impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.)\r\n\r\nValidity says nothing at all about whether the premises or conclusion are in fact true or not. Here\u2019s a valid argument:\r\n
Premise 1:<\/em> If I\u2019m over 7\u2019 tall, I\u2019m over 6\u2019 tall.\r\n\r\nPremise 2:<\/em> I\u2019m over 7\u2019 tall.\r\n\r\nConclusion:<\/em> I\u2019m over 6\u2019 tall.<\/blockquote>\r\nIt\u2019s impossible for Premises 1 and 2 to be true while the conclusion is false. So this is a valid argument. But it\u2019s missing another virtue we look for in arguments: we want them to be valid and<\/em> to have true premises. That is, we want sound arguments<\/strong>. The argument above is valid but not sound, since Premise 2 is false.\r\n\r\n
\r\n\r\n
    \r\n\t
  1. If an argument is valid and sound, what can you tell about the conclusion?<\/em><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n
    \r\n\r\nLet\u2019s go back to the boxing argument. Run our test on it: is it possible for Premise 1\u2014\u2018boxing is a dangerous activity\u2019\u2014to be true, while the conclusion\u2014\u2018boxing should be banned\u2019\u2014is false? If it is possible, what does that tell you about the validity or invalidity of the argument?\r\n\r\n
    \r\n\r\n
      \r\n\t
    1. There is something missing from the boxing argument. What is it? What could we add to make the argument valid? Is the argument, repaired in this way, sound?<\/em><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n
      \r\n\r\n
      Objection<\/strong><\/dt>
      An objection is an argument designed to show that a position is false. If theism (the claim that God exists) is our position, we would have to consider the objection that a benevolent deity would not allow innocent people to suffer.<\/dd>
      Reply<\/strong><\/dt>
      A reply is an answer to an objection. In the above example, we might reply that God does not let innocent people suffer; their suffering is due to human free will. (Of course, this may not be a good<\/em> reply.)<\/dd><\/dl>In addition to these concepts, we need to draw some distinctions among different kinds of positions or claims. These distinctions are controversial; Kant, in particular, will challenge some of the connections I draw between them. But we need to start somewhere!\r\n\r\nThe first distinction is between claims that are necessary<\/strong> and those that are possible<\/strong>.\r\n\r\n
      Necessary<\/strong><\/dt>
      A claim is necessary (that is, necessarily true) if it holds in every possible state of affairs. There is no possible state of affairs in which a necessarily true claim is false; it is impossible<\/em> for such a claim to be false.For example, many philosophers claim that if it is even possible that God exists, then it is necessary<\/em> that God exists. This claim is part of what\u2019s called the \u2018modal argument\u2019 for God\u2019s existence. The full argument only needs a few more premises:\r\n
        \r\n\t
      1. It is possible that God exists.<\/li>\r\n\t
      2. Since God is a perfect being, God possesses the property of necessary existence<\/em>; in other words, the property of existing in all possible states of affairs.<\/li>\r\n\t
      3. It is necessary that God exists.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\nThe first premise claims that there is at least one possible state of affairs in which God exists. The second premise claims that God has the property of existing in all possible states of affairs. These two premises entail that if God exists in even one possible state of affairs, then God exists in all possible states of affairs. That is, if it is possible that God exists, then it is necessary that God exists.\r\n\r\n<\/dd><\/dl>\r\n\r\n
        \r\n\r\n
          \r\n\t
        1. The modal argument just given for God\u2019s existence is a valid argument. Is it a sound argument?<\/em><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n
          \r\n\r\n
          Possible<\/strong><\/dt>
          A claim is possible (that is, possibly true) if it holds in at least one possible state of affairs. For example, I don\u2019t have green hair. But that doesn\u2019t mean that it\u2019s necessary<\/em> that I don\u2019t have green hair. I could have decided yesterday to dye my hair. If I could have decided to dye my hair, then there\u2019s a possible state of affairs in which I do have green hair. So while I actually<\/em> don\u2019t have green hair, I possibly<\/em> do have green hair.Suppose we could prove that it\u2019s possible for you to exist without a body. Even though you haven\u2019t existed in this state and probably never will, the claim that it\u2019s possible is a very significant one. For it would then mean that you are not a physical being.<\/dd><\/dl>The second distinction is between claims that are analytic<\/strong> and those that are synthetic<\/strong>.\r\n\r\n
          Analytic<\/strong><\/dt>
          Analytic claims are true in virtue of the meanings of the words involved. They are necessarily true. For example, consider \u2018bachelors are unmarried men.\u2019The denial of an analytic claim is a contradiction and is true in no possible world. There\u2019s no possible state of affairs in which a bachelor is married, because that contradicts the meaning of the word \u2018bachelor.\u2019 Analytic claims can be very interesting, even informative, but what they tell us seems to be about how we use words or symbols, not about how the world is independently of us. This is clearer if we look at how one argues for an analytic claim. All analytic claims are a priori<\/em><\/strong>, or capable of being known independently of experience. Mathematicians don\u2019t have to travel to the center of the earth to find out if 2+2 still equals 4 there; they know it a priori<\/em>. Similarly, we don\u2019t have to look to experience to justify an analytic claim; all we need to look at is the concepts involved.<\/dd>
          Synthetic<\/strong><\/dt>
          By contrast, some claims are synthetic<\/strong>, or true (if true at all) in virtue of how the world happens to be. The vast majority of claims we make fall into this category. They are not necessary truths, they are contingent<\/strong>, or merely possible: they could have been otherwise. Such claims are true only in some possible states of affairs. This means we have to find a different way to justify them than the way we justify an analytic claim. We capture this by saying that synthetic claims can be known only a posteriori<\/em><\/strong> or through experience. We need to find evidence for them that goes beyond the meanings of the words involved. Someone might know what \u2018rain\u2019 and \u2018Blacksburg\u2019 mean, and how to use dates, and still not have a clue whether it rained in Blacksburg on August 22.<\/dd><\/dl>There\u2019s another important distinction between kinds of claims. This distinction bears on how we go about justifying claims.\r\n\r\n
          Descriptive<\/strong><\/dt>
          Descriptive claims concern what is actually the case. All of the synthetic or analytic claims above are descriptive.<\/dd>
          Normative<\/strong><\/dt>
          Normative claims concern what should<\/em> be the case. If Bobo argues that no one ought to have more money than anyone else, you can\u2019t object that society isn\u2019t organized according to that principle, and that there\u2019s already lots of inequality. Bobo\u2019s making a claim about what ought<\/em> to be the case, not what is actually the case.<\/dd><\/dl>Homer Simpson provides a nice example of someone who doesn\u2019t appreciate this difference. As he\u2019s about to break into a liquor store, Marge says, \u2018but Homer, that would be wrong.\u2019 Homer replies, \u2018if we agree, Marge, what are we arguing about?\u2019\r\n\r\n
          \r\n\r\n
            \r\n\t
          1. Look again at the boxing argument above. What kind of premise did you have to insert in order to make it valid, a descriptive or a normative one?<\/em><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n
            \r\n\r\n
            Burden of proof<\/strong><\/dt>
            Debates that arise in philosophy often require us to decide who has the burden of proof. If a position violates our intuitions or asks us to accept a larger set of claims than we otherwise would be willing to accept, the person holding that claim has the burden of proof. For example: if I claim that, despite all appearances, all humans are selfish, I have the burden of proof: it is up to me to prove to you that people are selfish. If I can\u2019t do this, then I have lost. If I argue that, despite appearances, Fess Parker follows me everywhere I go, I have the burden of proof. If I cannot meet it, we have to conclude that my view is false. It\u2019s not up to you to prove me wrong: it\u2019s up to me to prove my position true.<\/dd><\/dl>Fallacies<\/strong> are errors in reasoning. There are lots of them, but the one about which we should be most worried in this class is:\r\n\r\n
            Strawman fallacy<\/strong><\/dt>
            We commit the strawman fallacy if we argue against a bad or distorted version of our opponent\u2019s position. Suppose that Jimmy is arguing with Bobo over evolution. Bobo believes evolution is true. Jimmy counters: \u2018I\u2019ll never believe evolution till I see a fish turn into a man.\u2019<\/dd><\/dl>If you\u2019re not getting the opposing position right, you can\u2019t argue against it. A core philosophical skill is being able to state an opposing position as carefully and persuasively as your own.\r\n\r\nThis is a skill we\u2019ll cultivate in this class, as we\u2019ll inevitably read philosophers with whom we disagree.\r\n\r\n
            \r\n\r\n
              \r\n\t
            1. Which of the following claims are analytic, and which are synthetic?<\/em>\r\n
                \r\n\t
              1. Any black cat is black.<\/li>\r\n\t
              2. There is life on other planets.<\/li>\r\n\t
              3. \u2018One try makes a customer\u2019 (slogan of a popular Richmond restaurant).<\/li>\r\n\t
              4. \u2018Unexpected disasters can happen \u2026 With little or no warning.\u20191<\/a><\/sup><\/li>\r\n\t
              5. From Plan 9 from Outer Space: \u2018He\u2019s been murdered, and somebody\u2019s responsible!\u2019<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n

                Glossary of Philosophical Positions<\/h2>\r\nIn what follows, I set out some of the basic positions we\u2019ll be working with. All of these characterizations are controversial. Again, we have to start somewhere. Don\u2019t worry if you don\u2019t fully grasp them now; we\u2019ll clarify and extend them as we go.\r\n

                Metaphysics<\/h3>\r\nThe most basic distinction is between a thing or a substance<\/strong> and a property. Fess Parker, a table, and the moon are all substances. These substances have properties<\/strong>: Fess Parker is the world\u2019s greatest actor, the table is stained, and so on. A state of affairs<\/strong> is a substance\u2019s having a property; that Socrates is bald<\/em> is a state of affairs.\r\n\r\nSome properties are intrinsic<\/strong>: the ones that things have just because of the way they are, like the property bald<\/em>. Other properties are relations<\/strong>, like loves<\/em> or is taller than<\/em>.\r\n\r\nA kind<\/strong> is a group or set of substances, properties, or states of affairs. Some kinds are natural<\/strong>: there is some reason for thinking everything in the kind belongs together. Some philosophers think that everything in a natural kind shares the same causal powers\u2014they can do the same things in the same conditions. (Consider the periodic table, for instance: why is it important whether an atom is an oxygen or hydrogen atom?)\r\n\r\nOther kinds are unnatural<\/strong>: they don\u2019t share enough features, or enough of the right kind of feature, in order to qualify as a natural kind.\r\n\r\n
                \r\n\r\n
                  \r\n\t
                1. List three things that form an unnatural kind<\/strong>.<\/em><\/li>\r\n\t
                2. One of David Letterman\u2019s best bits was a list of \u2018Top 10 Rejected Oprah Themes.\u2019 Among them was \u2018Problems of Guys Named Don\u2019. Why is this a bad idea for a talk-show theme?<\/em><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n
                  \r\n\r\nOn the Aristotelian picture, an essence<\/strong> (a.k.a. \u2018species,\u2019 \u2018form,\u2019 \u2018substantial form\u2019) has the following three features:\r\n
                    \r\n\t
                  1. it is the most fundamental explanatory property a thing possesses;<\/li>\r\n\t
                  2. the thing that has it cannot lose its essence and continue to exist;<\/li>\r\n\t
                  3. things with similar (or identical) essences form a natural kind.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n

                    Philosophy of Mind<\/h3>\r\n
                    Dualism<\/strong><\/dt>
                    Dualism is the thesis that mind and body are distinct substances. According to dualists, the mind is not the body, nor does it \u2018arise\u2019 naturally as a function of the body\u2019s behavior (in the way that, say, digestion does).<\/dd>
                    Identity theory<\/strong><\/dt>
                    The identity theory is the thesis that the mind and the body (in particular, the brain) are just the same thing. \u2018Mind\u2019 and \u2018brain\u2019 are like \u2018Clark Kent\u2019 and \u2018Superman\u2019: two ways of referring to the same thing.<\/dd><\/dl>\r\n

                    Free will<\/h3>\r\n
                    Determinism<\/strong><\/dt>
                    Determinism is the thesis that every state of affairs follows necessarily from every prior state of affairs. For instance, if it is true that I am typing now, the determinist claims that I could not possibly be doing anything else, given the immediately prior state of the universe. So far, determinism says nothing at all about free will.<\/dd><\/dl>The hard determinist<\/strong> holds that since determinism is true, we cannot have free will.\r\n\r\nThe libertarian<\/strong> holds that since determinism is false, we can have free will.\r\n\r\n
                    \r\n\r\n
                      \r\n\t
                    1. The hard determinist and libertarian agree about the consequences of determinism. What do they both think must be the case<\/em> if determinism is true?<\/em><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n
                      \r\n\r\nThe compatibilist<\/strong> or soft determinist<\/strong> claims that determinism and free will are compatible. This position denies the inference above.\r\n

                      Epistemology<\/h3>\r\nEmpiricism<\/strong> is a cluster of different claims about knowledge, all emphasizing the role of experience.\r\n\r\n
                      Materials empiricism<\/strong><\/dt>
                      Materials empiricism is the thesis that all the materials for knowledge come from experience. The content of all of our thoughts is ultimately traceable back to some experience or other.<\/dd>
                      Justification empiricism<\/strong><\/dt>
                      Justification empiricism is the thesis that any justification for a claim has to appeal to experience.<\/dd><\/dl>Note that the two can come apart. So I might be a materials empiricist and yet deny justification empiricism, because I think that some<\/em> claims (e.g., analytic claims) can be justified merely by the concepts involved.\r\n\r\nLargely opposed to empiricism is a set of claims we will call rationalism<\/strong>:\r\n\r\n
                      Materials rationalism<\/strong><\/dt>
                      Materials rationalism is the thesis that at least some of the materials for knowledge do not come from experience.<\/dd>
                      Justification rationalism<\/strong><\/dt>
                      Justification rationalism is the thesis that at least some justifications do not appeal exclusively to experience.<\/dd><\/dl>Independent of the empiricist\/rationalist debate is a question about the order of knowledge<\/strong>:\r\n\r\n
                      Existentialism<\/strong><\/dt>
                      Existentialism is the thesis that before one can know the essence of a thing, one must first know that it exists.<\/dd>
                      Essentialism<\/strong><\/dt>
                      Essentialism is the thesis that one can (or even must) know the essence of a thing before one can know that it exists.<\/dd><\/dl>Another debate in epistemology relates to the role of perception<\/strong>:\r\n\r\n
                      Direct realism<\/strong><\/dt>
                      Direct realism is the thesis that, in perception, we are directly perceiving real, ordinary objects.<\/dd>
                      Indirect realism<\/strong><\/dt>
                      The opposing thesis, indirect realism, claims that in perception we directly perceive only our own ideas or sensations. It is only because these ideas represent (or are \u2018about\u2019) objects in the world that we can be said to perceive those objects.<\/dd><\/dl>\r\n

                      Glossary of Principles<\/h2>\r\nThe principles listed below were controversial in the modern period; some of the philosophers we will read try to argue for them, some just assume them, and others assume that they are false. Try to identify when these principles are mentioned (sometimes implicitly) in the readings below, especially in the writings of Hume and Descartes.\r\n\r\n
                      Conceivability Principle (CP)<\/strong><\/dt>
                      If x<\/em> is conceivable, x<\/em> is possible. Note the contrapositive: if x<\/em> is impossible, x<\/em> is inconceivable.<\/dd><\/dl>These are logically equivalent. The converse, however, is not: if x<\/em> is possible, x<\/em> is conceivable. This principle seems to be far too strong. Can you see why?\r\n\r\n
                      Causal Principle (CAP)<\/strong><\/dt>
                      There must be at least as much reality (being, or perfection) in the cause as there is in the effect. This principle is from Descartes.<\/dd>
                      Epistemic Principle (EP)<\/strong><\/dt>
                      Everything (that is, every proposition) I clearly and distinctly perceive (that is, believe and thoroughly understand) is true. This principle is from Descartes.<\/dd>
                      Copy Principle (CPY)<\/strong><\/dt>
                      Every idea is a copy of some impression or set of impressions. This principle is from Hume.<\/dd>
                      Separability Principle (SP)<\/strong><\/dt>
                      Any two distinct perceptions can, in thought, be separated. This principle is from Hume.<\/dd><\/dl>\r\n
                      \r\n\r\n
                      \r\n\r\n
                        \r\n\t
                      1. Virginia Department of Emergency Management<\/a>.\u21a9<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n \r\n\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"

                        Like any discipline, philosophy has its own vocabulary. Here are some of the most basic terms and the connections among them:<\/p>\n

                        \n
                        Position<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                        A position (or a thesis) is a claim or set of claims; for example, that the mind is identical to the brain, or that people act always from self-interest.<\/dd>\n
                        Argument<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                        An argument is a set of claims (called \u2018premises\u2019) designed to show another claim (a conclusion) to be true. (This is a special use of the word: usually people use \u2018argument\u2019 to mean a verbal altercation). For example:Premise 1:<\/em> If it\u2019s raining outside, the lawnmower will get wet.<\/dd>\n
                        <\/dd>\n
                        Premise 2:<\/em> It\u2019s raining outside.Conclusion<\/em>: The lawnmower will get wet.<\/p>\n<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                        As you can see, arguments aren\u2019t peculiar to philosophy: we use them all the time to get around the world, although we almost never bother to make them explicit. Even in this class, we won\u2019t always go to the trouble of putting arguments in this explicit form. But it can often be helpful to do so, and it\u2019s important that arguments can<\/em> be make explicit. To see why, consider an argument put forth by the British Medical Association:<\/p>\n

                        Premise 1:<\/em> Boxing is a dangerous activity.<\/p>\n

                        Conclusion:<\/em> Boxing should be banned.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

                        Does the premise entail the conclusion? That is, does the premise show the conclusion to be true? In other words, is this a valid argument<\/strong>\u2014one whose premises entail the conclusion? (Another way to put it: a valid argument is such that it\u2019s impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.)<\/p>\n

                        Validity says nothing at all about whether the premises or conclusion are in fact true or not. Here\u2019s a valid argument:<\/p>\n

                        Premise 1:<\/em> If I\u2019m over 7\u2019 tall, I\u2019m over 6\u2019 tall.<\/p>\n

                        Premise 2:<\/em> I\u2019m over 7\u2019 tall.<\/p>\n

                        Conclusion:<\/em> I\u2019m over 6\u2019 tall.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

                        It\u2019s impossible for Premises 1 and 2 to be true while the conclusion is false. So this is a valid argument. But it\u2019s missing another virtue we look for in arguments: we want them to be valid and<\/em> to have true premises. That is, we want sound arguments<\/strong>. The argument above is valid but not sound, since Premise 2 is false.<\/p>\n

                        \n
                          \n
                        1. If an argument is valid and sound, what can you tell about the conclusion?<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                          \n

                          Let\u2019s go back to the boxing argument. Run our test on it: is it possible for Premise 1\u2014\u2018boxing is a dangerous activity\u2019\u2014to be true, while the conclusion\u2014\u2018boxing should be banned\u2019\u2014is false? If it is possible, what does that tell you about the validity or invalidity of the argument?<\/p>\n

                          \n
                            \n
                          1. There is something missing from the boxing argument. What is it? What could we add to make the argument valid? Is the argument, repaired in this way, sound?<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                            \n
                            \n
                            Objection<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                            An objection is an argument designed to show that a position is false. If theism (the claim that God exists) is our position, we would have to consider the objection that a benevolent deity would not allow innocent people to suffer.<\/dd>\n
                            Reply<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                            A reply is an answer to an objection. In the above example, we might reply that God does not let innocent people suffer; their suffering is due to human free will. (Of course, this may not be a good<\/em> reply.)<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                            In addition to these concepts, we need to draw some distinctions among different kinds of positions or claims. These distinctions are controversial; Kant, in particular, will challenge some of the connections I draw between them. But we need to start somewhere!<\/p>\n

                            The first distinction is between claims that are necessary<\/strong> and those that are possible<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

                            \n
                            Necessary<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                            A claim is necessary (that is, necessarily true) if it holds in every possible state of affairs. There is no possible state of affairs in which a necessarily true claim is false; it is impossible<\/em> for such a claim to be false.For example, many philosophers claim that if it is even possible that God exists, then it is necessary<\/em> that God exists. This claim is part of what\u2019s called the \u2018modal argument\u2019 for God\u2019s existence. The full argument only needs a few more premises:<\/p>\n
                              \n
                            1. It is possible that God exists.<\/li>\n
                            2. Since God is a perfect being, God possesses the property of necessary existence<\/em>; in other words, the property of existing in all possible states of affairs.<\/li>\n
                            3. It is necessary that God exists.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                              The first premise claims that there is at least one possible state of affairs in which God exists. The second premise claims that God has the property of existing in all possible states of affairs. These two premises entail that if God exists in even one possible state of affairs, then God exists in all possible states of affairs. That is, if it is possible that God exists, then it is necessary that God exists.<\/p>\n<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                              \n
                                \n
                              1. The modal argument just given for God\u2019s existence is a valid argument. Is it a sound argument?<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                                \n
                                \n
                                Possible<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                A claim is possible (that is, possibly true) if it holds in at least one possible state of affairs. For example, I don\u2019t have green hair. But that doesn\u2019t mean that it\u2019s necessary<\/em> that I don\u2019t have green hair. I could have decided yesterday to dye my hair. If I could have decided to dye my hair, then there\u2019s a possible state of affairs in which I do have green hair. So while I actually<\/em> don\u2019t have green hair, I possibly<\/em> do have green hair.Suppose we could prove that it\u2019s possible for you to exist without a body. Even though you haven\u2019t existed in this state and probably never will, the claim that it\u2019s possible is a very significant one. For it would then mean that you are not a physical being.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                The second distinction is between claims that are analytic<\/strong> and those that are synthetic<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

                                \n
                                Analytic<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                Analytic claims are true in virtue of the meanings of the words involved. They are necessarily true. For example, consider \u2018bachelors are unmarried men.\u2019The denial of an analytic claim is a contradiction and is true in no possible world. There\u2019s no possible state of affairs in which a bachelor is married, because that contradicts the meaning of the word \u2018bachelor.\u2019 Analytic claims can be very interesting, even informative, but what they tell us seems to be about how we use words or symbols, not about how the world is independently of us. This is clearer if we look at how one argues for an analytic claim. All analytic claims are a priori<\/em><\/strong>, or capable of being known independently of experience. Mathematicians don\u2019t have to travel to the center of the earth to find out if 2+2 still equals 4 there; they know it a priori<\/em>. Similarly, we don\u2019t have to look to experience to justify an analytic claim; all we need to look at is the concepts involved.<\/dd>\n
                                Synthetic<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                By contrast, some claims are synthetic<\/strong>, or true (if true at all) in virtue of how the world happens to be. The vast majority of claims we make fall into this category. They are not necessary truths, they are contingent<\/strong>, or merely possible: they could have been otherwise. Such claims are true only in some possible states of affairs. This means we have to find a different way to justify them than the way we justify an analytic claim. We capture this by saying that synthetic claims can be known only a posteriori<\/em><\/strong> or through experience. We need to find evidence for them that goes beyond the meanings of the words involved. Someone might know what \u2018rain\u2019 and \u2018Blacksburg\u2019 mean, and how to use dates, and still not have a clue whether it rained in Blacksburg on August 22.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                There\u2019s another important distinction between kinds of claims. This distinction bears on how we go about justifying claims.<\/p>\n

                                \n
                                Descriptive<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                Descriptive claims concern what is actually the case. All of the synthetic or analytic claims above are descriptive.<\/dd>\n
                                Normative<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                Normative claims concern what should<\/em> be the case. If Bobo argues that no one ought to have more money than anyone else, you can\u2019t object that society isn\u2019t organized according to that principle, and that there\u2019s already lots of inequality. Bobo\u2019s making a claim about what ought<\/em> to be the case, not what is actually the case.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                Homer Simpson provides a nice example of someone who doesn\u2019t appreciate this difference. As he\u2019s about to break into a liquor store, Marge says, \u2018but Homer, that would be wrong.\u2019 Homer replies, \u2018if we agree, Marge, what are we arguing about?\u2019<\/p>\n

                                \n
                                  \n
                                1. Look again at the boxing argument above. What kind of premise did you have to insert in order to make it valid, a descriptive or a normative one?<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                                  \n
                                  \n
                                  Burden of proof<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                  Debates that arise in philosophy often require us to decide who has the burden of proof. If a position violates our intuitions or asks us to accept a larger set of claims than we otherwise would be willing to accept, the person holding that claim has the burden of proof. For example: if I claim that, despite all appearances, all humans are selfish, I have the burden of proof: it is up to me to prove to you that people are selfish. If I can\u2019t do this, then I have lost. If I argue that, despite appearances, Fess Parker follows me everywhere I go, I have the burden of proof. If I cannot meet it, we have to conclude that my view is false. It\u2019s not up to you to prove me wrong: it\u2019s up to me to prove my position true.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                  Fallacies<\/strong> are errors in reasoning. There are lots of them, but the one about which we should be most worried in this class is:<\/p>\n

                                  \n
                                  Strawman fallacy<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                  We commit the strawman fallacy if we argue against a bad or distorted version of our opponent\u2019s position. Suppose that Jimmy is arguing with Bobo over evolution. Bobo believes evolution is true. Jimmy counters: \u2018I\u2019ll never believe evolution till I see a fish turn into a man.\u2019<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                  If you\u2019re not getting the opposing position right, you can\u2019t argue against it. A core philosophical skill is being able to state an opposing position as carefully and persuasively as your own.<\/p>\n

                                  This is a skill we\u2019ll cultivate in this class, as we\u2019ll inevitably read philosophers with whom we disagree.<\/p>\n

                                  \n
                                    \n
                                  1. Which of the following claims are analytic, and which are synthetic?<\/em>\n
                                      \n
                                    1. Any black cat is black.<\/li>\n
                                    2. There is life on other planets.<\/li>\n
                                    3. \u2018One try makes a customer\u2019 (slogan of a popular Richmond restaurant).<\/li>\n
                                    4. \u2018Unexpected disasters can happen \u2026 With little or no warning.\u20191<\/a><\/sup><\/li>\n
                                    5. From Plan 9 from Outer Space: \u2018He\u2019s been murdered, and somebody\u2019s responsible!\u2019<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                      Glossary of Philosophical Positions<\/h2>\n

                                      In what follows, I set out some of the basic positions we\u2019ll be working with. All of these characterizations are controversial. Again, we have to start somewhere. Don\u2019t worry if you don\u2019t fully grasp them now; we\u2019ll clarify and extend them as we go.<\/p>\n

                                      Metaphysics<\/h3>\n

                                      The most basic distinction is between a thing or a substance<\/strong> and a property. Fess Parker, a table, and the moon are all substances. These substances have properties<\/strong>: Fess Parker is the world\u2019s greatest actor, the table is stained, and so on. A state of affairs<\/strong> is a substance\u2019s having a property; that Socrates is bald<\/em> is a state of affairs.<\/p>\n

                                      Some properties are intrinsic<\/strong>: the ones that things have just because of the way they are, like the property bald<\/em>. Other properties are relations<\/strong>, like loves<\/em> or is taller than<\/em>.<\/p>\n

                                      A kind<\/strong> is a group or set of substances, properties, or states of affairs. Some kinds are natural<\/strong>: there is some reason for thinking everything in the kind belongs together. Some philosophers think that everything in a natural kind shares the same causal powers\u2014they can do the same things in the same conditions. (Consider the periodic table, for instance: why is it important whether an atom is an oxygen or hydrogen atom?)<\/p>\n

                                      Other kinds are unnatural<\/strong>: they don\u2019t share enough features, or enough of the right kind of feature, in order to qualify as a natural kind.<\/p>\n

                                      \n
                                        \n
                                      1. List three things that form an unnatural kind<\/strong>.<\/em><\/li>\n
                                      2. One of David Letterman\u2019s best bits was a list of \u2018Top 10 Rejected Oprah Themes.\u2019 Among them was \u2018Problems of Guys Named Don\u2019. Why is this a bad idea for a talk-show theme?<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                                        \n

                                        On the Aristotelian picture, an essence<\/strong> (a.k.a. \u2018species,\u2019 \u2018form,\u2019 \u2018substantial form\u2019) has the following three features:<\/p>\n

                                          \n
                                        1. it is the most fundamental explanatory property a thing possesses;<\/li>\n
                                        2. the thing that has it cannot lose its essence and continue to exist;<\/li>\n
                                        3. things with similar (or identical) essences form a natural kind.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                          Philosophy of Mind<\/h3>\n
                                          \n
                                          Dualism<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                          Dualism is the thesis that mind and body are distinct substances. According to dualists, the mind is not the body, nor does it \u2018arise\u2019 naturally as a function of the body\u2019s behavior (in the way that, say, digestion does).<\/dd>\n
                                          Identity theory<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                          The identity theory is the thesis that the mind and the body (in particular, the brain) are just the same thing. \u2018Mind\u2019 and \u2018brain\u2019 are like \u2018Clark Kent\u2019 and \u2018Superman\u2019: two ways of referring to the same thing.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                          Free will<\/h3>\n
                                          \n
                                          Determinism<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                          Determinism is the thesis that every state of affairs follows necessarily from every prior state of affairs. For instance, if it is true that I am typing now, the determinist claims that I could not possibly be doing anything else, given the immediately prior state of the universe. So far, determinism says nothing at all about free will.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                          The hard determinist<\/strong> holds that since determinism is true, we cannot have free will.<\/p>\n

                                          The libertarian<\/strong> holds that since determinism is false, we can have free will.<\/p>\n

                                          \n
                                            \n
                                          1. The hard determinist and libertarian agree about the consequences of determinism. What do they both think must be the case<\/em> if determinism is true?<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                                            \n

                                            The compatibilist<\/strong> or soft determinist<\/strong> claims that determinism and free will are compatible. This position denies the inference above.<\/p>\n

                                            Epistemology<\/h3>\n

                                            Empiricism<\/strong> is a cluster of different claims about knowledge, all emphasizing the role of experience.<\/p>\n

                                            \n
                                            Materials empiricism<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            Materials empiricism is the thesis that all the materials for knowledge come from experience. The content of all of our thoughts is ultimately traceable back to some experience or other.<\/dd>\n
                                            Justification empiricism<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            Justification empiricism is the thesis that any justification for a claim has to appeal to experience.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                            Note that the two can come apart. So I might be a materials empiricist and yet deny justification empiricism, because I think that some<\/em> claims (e.g., analytic claims) can be justified merely by the concepts involved.<\/p>\n

                                            Largely opposed to empiricism is a set of claims we will call rationalism<\/strong>:<\/p>\n

                                            \n
                                            Materials rationalism<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            Materials rationalism is the thesis that at least some of the materials for knowledge do not come from experience.<\/dd>\n
                                            Justification rationalism<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            Justification rationalism is the thesis that at least some justifications do not appeal exclusively to experience.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                            Independent of the empiricist\/rationalist debate is a question about the order of knowledge<\/strong>:<\/p>\n

                                            \n
                                            Existentialism<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            Existentialism is the thesis that before one can know the essence of a thing, one must first know that it exists.<\/dd>\n
                                            Essentialism<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            Essentialism is the thesis that one can (or even must) know the essence of a thing before one can know that it exists.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                            Another debate in epistemology relates to the role of perception<\/strong>:<\/p>\n

                                            \n
                                            Direct realism<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            Direct realism is the thesis that, in perception, we are directly perceiving real, ordinary objects.<\/dd>\n
                                            Indirect realism<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            The opposing thesis, indirect realism, claims that in perception we directly perceive only our own ideas or sensations. It is only because these ideas represent (or are \u2018about\u2019) objects in the world that we can be said to perceive those objects.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                            Glossary of Principles<\/h2>\n

                                            The principles listed below were controversial in the modern period; some of the philosophers we will read try to argue for them, some just assume them, and others assume that they are false. Try to identify when these principles are mentioned (sometimes implicitly) in the readings below, especially in the writings of Hume and Descartes.<\/p>\n

                                            \n
                                            Conceivability Principle (CP)<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            If x<\/em> is conceivable, x<\/em> is possible. Note the contrapositive: if x<\/em> is impossible, x<\/em> is inconceivable.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n

                                            These are logically equivalent. The converse, however, is not: if x<\/em> is possible, x<\/em> is conceivable. This principle seems to be far too strong. Can you see why?<\/p>\n

                                            \n
                                            Causal Principle (CAP)<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            There must be at least as much reality (being, or perfection) in the cause as there is in the effect. This principle is from Descartes.<\/dd>\n
                                            Epistemic Principle (EP)<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            Everything (that is, every proposition) I clearly and distinctly perceive (that is, believe and thoroughly understand) is true. This principle is from Descartes.<\/dd>\n
                                            Copy Principle (CPY)<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            Every idea is a copy of some impression or set of impressions. This principle is from Hume.<\/dd>\n
                                            Separability Principle (SP)<\/strong><\/dt>\n
                                            Any two distinct perceptions can, in thought, be separated. This principle is from Hume.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n
                                            \n
                                            \n
                                              \n
                                            1. Virginia Department of Emergency Management<\/a>.\u21a9<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

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